#Swift publisher vs pages series#

We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

#Swift publisher vs pages series#

Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential-the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions-is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. 3Chemistry Division, Spiez Laboratory, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Spiez, Switzerlandĭevelopments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases.2Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.1NBC Arms Control Staff Unit, Spiez Laboratory, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Spiez, Switzerland.Maximilian Brackmann 1 * ‡ §, Michèle Gemünden 2 † ‡ §, Cédric Invernizzi 1 § and Stefan Mogl 3